Regime Type and Civilian Protection in UN Peace Operations

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Abstract

Civilian protection has been an integral part of United Nations (UN) peace operations since 1999. Yet, since that time, the relative share of peacekeepers provided by autocratic troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs) to UN peace operations has increased. What impact does the increased participation of autocratic T/PCCs have on civilian protection? Security forces from autocracies externalize their training and domestic use through peacekeeping which has negative implications for civilian protection. Through their everyday interactions with local actors and work with host government, including training security forces, I argue that increasing personal from autocratic T/PCCs leads to additional civilian victimization and one-sided violence (OSV) committed by government forces. Quantitative evidence of monthly contributions from 1990-2020 suggest that increasing peacekeepers from autocracies relative to democracies leads to additional civilian victimization, with less robust evidence for government OSV. This research contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of peace operations and how domestic politics impacts foreign intervention.

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Introduction

In 1990, China participated in its first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, sending five military observers to support the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) (United Nations Peacekeeping N.d.*b*). Since then, China's participation in UN peacekeeping has increased significantly. As of February 2025, China is the 8th largest contributor and the only permanent member of the Security Council (UNSC) within the top 20 troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs). China's increasing participation in UN peace operations mirrors a more general trend– missions are increasingly composed of peacekeepers from autocratic countries (Duursma and Gledhill 2019). Personnel from countries with regimes that lack constraint and accountability have the potential to impede the UN's peace efforts. In addition to autocracies, countries with histories of human rights abuses and repression are represented in the top contributors to peacekeeping, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, and Rwanda. Testimony from the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission in The Gambia illustrates how security forces who had engaged in the murder or abuse of political opponents of former president Yahya Jammeh were deployed to UN peace operations as a reward for their actions (Dwyer 2024, 954).

At the same time that autocracies have increased their participation, UN peacekeeping has evolved from monitoring ceasefires to taking a more involved approach, including tasks like election assistance, re-/standing up security forces, building state capacity, and civilian protection. Since 1999, all multidimensional UN peace operations have included civilian protection mandates (Howard and Dayal 2018). Yet modern missions operate within a fundamental paradox: states that shoulder the burden of providing peacekeepers are lower capacity, un-democratic states and may be dealing with their own internal struggles (Adhikari 2020, 369-70). Though UN peacekeepers are tasked with helping communities to, among other tasks, "strengthen democracy...[and] to secure human rights" (United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council 2000), what does it mean that personnel

from countries that are deficient in either or both are carrying out these missions? How does the increased focus on civilian protection and increasing participation of peacekeepers from autocracies interact? This paper investigates these developments and addresses the following question: What impact does the increased participation of autocratic contributors to UN peace operations have on civilian protection?

Existing research has decomposed peace operations to explore how different characteristics affect peacekeepers' ability to protection civilians, including ethnicity and language (Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020); gender equality (Karim and Beardsley 2017); domestic institutions (Rodriguez and Kinne 2019); unit types (Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Dworschak and Cil 2022; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014; Kathman and Melin 2016); and the quality of peacekeepers (Haass and Ansorg 2018; Kreps 2010). My contribution builds on existing work on regime type and peacekeeping that includes Duursma and Gledhill (2019), who interrogate why autocracies are increasing their participation, Melin and Kathman (2023), who show that democracies are less likely to withdraw their personnel, and Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri (2020) who look at differences in democracy scores between peacekeepers and host country actors. In doing so, I look at the relationship between peacekeepers from autocratic contributors and one of the tasks by which the UN often judged: civilian protection.

I argue that the regime type of contributors is important to understanding peacekeeper performance because the extent of accountability and constraint a regime faces impacts the way governments organize, train, and use their security forces. Without constraints on the government and its actions, regimes can utilize security forces in nefarious ways. The more autocratic a regime, the more likely it is to have fewer avenues of accountability and constraint. As a result, peacekeepers from autocracies negatively impact civilian protection as a result of domestic political characteristics and behavior that are externalized to mission host countries through deployment. Two ways peacekeepers can impact peace in mission host countries is building trust with local actors and training host security forces. To empirically

test the differential impact of peacekeepers from autocratic contributors on peace operations, I focus on violence against civilians. I argue that increasing peacekeeping personnel from autocracies relative to democracies will lead to an increase in civilian fatalities, including one-sided violence (OSV) committed by government forces. In this paper, I am interested in the *relative* performance of contingents from autocracies to democracies, recognizing that peacekeepers from democracies engage in similarly detrimental actions.

In the statistical analyses, I find that increasing autocratic contributions to a peace operation, relative to contributions from democracies, is related to an increase in the number of civilian fatalities and an increase in OSV by government forces, though evidence for government OSV is less robust. Following the analysis, I explore two plausible pathways that could explain these findings, focusing on trust-building and training and using examples from Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. While this paper represents a first step at further exploring this relationship, my findings have important implications for the future of peace operations, especially given the generally positive impact found in existing research on peacekeeping (Walter, Howard and Fortna 2021).

Violence Against Civilians and UN Peace Operations

Civilian victimization in conflict can follow an instrumental logic, with the aim of inducing cooperation (Kalyvas 2006) or thwarting opposition (Balcells 2017), or be the result of lack of command control (Hoover-Green 2018). Governments and rebel groups alike use violence as a way of coercing support or inducing civilians to withhold support for opposition (Valentino 2014, 95). Since groups that depend on civilian support are less likely to engage in violence against civilians (Weinstein 2009), leaders also grapple with the need to channel their fighters' violence such that they exercise restraint (Hoover-Green 2018). Crucially, access to and availability of information drives levels of violence, as better information allows combatants to target more effectively, rather than engaging in indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006).

Seeking to thwart violence, especially against civilians, UN peace operations deploy to

contexts of conflict (or in its aftermath) seeking to aid peace efforts; and they have a remarkably positive track record in doing so (Walter, Howard and Fortna 2021). Since the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) all multidimensional UN peace operations have included a mandate to protect civilians. Peacekeepers reduce civilian victimization by acting as a physical barrier between combatants and civilians, making violence more difficult (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013), and imposing costs for targeting civilians (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019; Reeder, Hendricks and Goldring 2022), thereby altering combatants' incentives to engage in violence (Fortna 2008). By working with local communities, UN peacekeepers might lead civilians to provide information on rebel groups, helping to overcome information asymmetries between peacekeepers and belligerents (Hunnicutt and Nomikos 2020). By creating space for dialogue, peacekeepers can help establish or re-establish intergroup cooperation, thereby reducing violence (Smidt 2020).

Recent literature has looked at the composition of UN peace operations and how it impacts peacekeepers' ability to protect civilians. Peace operations are multinational undertakings, which creates the space for cohesion or friction between country contingents. Higher quality military peacekeepers that are better equipped and trained tend to be associated with improved protection of civilians (Haass and Ansorg 2018; Kreps 2010). However, having better quality troops does not guarantee that better trained and equipped personnel will be the ones to deploy to missions– contributors could keep their better trained and equipped personnel at home, sending lower quality personnel instead.

In addition to quality, diversity within the mission and between the mission and local actors can impact the ability of UN peace operations to reduce violence against civilians (Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020). While increasing diversity within a UN peace operation can reduce violence against civilians, signaling the commitment of the international community to resolving violence, increased geographic and cultural diversity between UN peacekeepers and local populations can lead to increases in violence against civilians (Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020, 142).

The composition of UN peace operations also impacts other outcomes related to civilians. Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney (2021) find that peacekeepers, particularly UNPOL, from countries with more robust civil societies provide security and promote norms associated with non-violent forms of political engagement that makes non-violent protest more likely in post-civil war countries. Yet many UN peacekeeping missions, including ones in Mali and CAR, are deployed to contexts where there is little peace to keep. Domestic contributor conditions also impact the propensity of peacekeepers to engage in abusive behavior– increased gender equality in T/PCCs reduces the prevalence of SEAV allegations in missions (Karim and Beardsley 2017), and increasing the number of peacekeepers from T/PCCs with free press and rule of law institutions reduces peacekeeper abuses (Rodriguez and Kinne 2019).

Yet the increased focus on protection of civilians can have negative implications for the mission. Day and Hunt (2021) argue that the focus on civilian protection pulls resources from other tasks, creates host country reliance on the UN to provide this state function, and sets expectations for peacekeeper performance. Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) find that UN peacekeepers are able to prevent OSV committed by rebel groups, but are not as effective in stopping OSV committed by government forces. Since the early 2000s, UNPOL have been involved in reforming host country law enforcement agencies, which, in the case of South Sudan, negatively impacted violence against civilians as the South Sudanese National Police, trained by UNMIS and UNMISS, then engaged in human rights abuses when violence broke out in the country in 2013 (Hunt 2022, 18).

Following the failures of the UN in the 1990s, protecting the most vulnerable in conflict has become a top priority. While existing work points both to the efficacy and drawbacks of the focus on civilian protection and capabilities of peacekeepers to stop violence against civilians, exploring how the changing composition of UN peace operation impacts the UN's ability to provide this protection is increasingly relevant. Though the difference in democracy scores between T/PCCs and host country personnel impacts levels of violence against civilians in a conflict (Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri 2020), I seek to provide a more thorough

account of the links between how security forces are organized and used in autocracies and how their peacekeepers then impact violence in mission host countries. In doing so, I argue that the relationship we observe between, for example, peacekeeper quality and their experience with non-violent public engagement is driven by the regime type of contributing countries. Relying on existing work that demonstrates differences in the ways autocrats tend to organize their security forces compared to their democratic counterparts, I lay out the implications for how security forces maintain security domestically that ultimately externalizes as they deploy to UN peace operations.

Why Participate?

Why, though, would autocratic countries choose to contribute to UN peacekeeping, given its "liberal, democratic character" (Coleman and Job 2021; Doyle and Sambanis 2000)? Here, I focus on two factors for autocracies that are primarily driven by autocrat's private gains seeking behavior, which favors the provision of goods that benefit the autocrat and their supporters for the autocrat to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 279). Rather than being motivated by the public goods provision– peacekeeping and peacebuilding– autocracies are more likely to dispatch their security forces abroad when it benefits them/their regime. Two motivations are particularly salient: coup proofing and training.

First, deploying security forces to UN missions can act as a means of coup proofing by sending potential coup participants abroad and/or through the renumeration countries receive that incentivizes domestic peace (Lundgren 2018). For example, countries with a history of coup attempts, like Bangladesh, participate as a means of preventing the military from increased participation in domestic politics (Murthy 2007). States that participate can also gain foreign aid from more powerful countries seeking to avoid supplying their own personnel (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020, 313).

Participating in UN missions also provides an opportunity for contributors' security forces to gain additional training and experience (Axe 2010; Copetas 2007; Gaibulloev, San-

dler and Shimzu 2009; Kahn 2014; Kathman and Melin 2016), especially when personnel can receive specialized training they wouldn't otherwise be able to receive domestically (Malik 2013*b*). For Pakistani peacekeepers, the mission acts as "an avenue for infusing modern concepts pertaining to human rights, gender mainstreaming, the handling of vulnerable persons, and community policing" (Malik 2013*a*, 220). This motivation could, however, build the capacity of security forces to then turn on the regime, forcing autocrats to balance the benefits and potential threats of participation.

Autocracies and UN Peace Operations

Differences between democracies and autocracies are well known across a variety of dimensions. Autocracies, and certain forms thereof, are more likely to engage in repression (Davenport 2007), have security forces that engage in sexual violence (Willis 2021), engage in conflict (Weeks 2012), and under-perform in battle (Talmadge 2016). With different sources of regime support and lacking the threat of regular removal from office, autocrats and their governments do not face the same kinds of constraints on behavior and accountability for actions in office. Constraint and accountability come from a variety of sources: citizens, civil society organizations, media, legislature, and judiciary (Lührmann, Marquardt and Mechkova 2020). In democracies, these accountability mechanisms tend to have protections within countries' legal framework that sets the rules of the game (Wright 2021, 2). Citizens' right to vote in elections, systems of checks and balances, and protections for media and civil society ensure a robust system of government oversight and accountability, ultimately serving to constrain the behavior of elected officials and their appointees.

In autocracies, the lack of some or all of these accountability mechanisms leaves leaders in a privileged position of power. Autocrats impose media restrictions, outlawing or closing those critical of the regime; curb access to the internet; and winnow or erase altogether the space for civil society organizations to effectively operate. Though autocrats may have party support or even hold elections, these elections are often superficial with little chance of

turnover (Hyde 2011; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010, 124-5). While leaders in democracies seek support from citizens for elections, leaders in autocracies focus on maintaining support from the security forces (Bellin 2012; Lai and Slater 2006; Slater et al. 2023) and elites, including parties and other institutions autocrats use to maintain power (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Pepinsky 2014; Rivera 2017; Weeks 2008). Even in personalist regimes where power is concentrated in one individual, regime survival can hinge on the decision of security forces to side with or oppose the regime (Bellin 2012; Svolik 2012). The lack of constraint and accountability in autocracies compared to democracies creates different incentives for leaders and, importantly, security forces. Smaller winning coalitions allow autocrats to engage in private gains seeking behavior, which can attract security personnel willing to engage in abuse (Horne, Lloyd and Pieper 2022, 748).

Autocratic security institutions are often designed in a leader/regime-centric way that vests the interests of the security apparatus in the survival of the regime, especially where security institutions are patrimonially organized (Bellin 2012, 129). Leaders in autocracies engage in a variety of practices to ensure loyalty and protect against coups from security forces, including replacing heads of security forces (Dragu and Przeworski 2019); counterbalancing (De Bruin 2020) or fragmentation (Greitens 2016); and stacking based on ethnicity, location, and/or socio-economic status (Allen and Brooks 2023). These organizational practices seek to balance the ability of security forces to succeed while also ensuring they do not use their coercive power against the regime. While militaries in democratic regimes are often subordinate to civilian control [1] (Ruffa 2018), they often play an out-sized role in autocracies, sometimes leading the government or providing protection for the regime (Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012). Autocrats use (secret) police to engage in repression, but also call on the military to do so in the face of mass uprisings (Svolik 2012, 125).

These practices, combined with the lack of avenues for accountability and constraint in autocracies, creates situations where domestic actors become the object to provide protection

[1] A notable exception to this being China, which has civilian control of the military (Slater et al. 2023).

from rather than *for*. This creates tense civil-security relations that incentivizes operating in the autocrat's and/or security force's interest, often with repressive tactics (Scharpf and Gläßel 2020), and existing research has demonstrated how this affects the performance of security forces in autocracies. Domestically, fragmented or counterbalanced security forces tend to be more violent, stoke competition (Greitens 2016, 5, 26), and, at least initially, increase the probability of coups (De Bruin 2020). These forces tend to be more violent when they don't regularly engage with civilians as they "perceive a lower social and psychological cost to violence against these strangers" (Greitens 2016, 52). In regimes where citizens don't have the ability to vote out politicians and/or the media are restricted in their coverage, these behaviors often occur without repercussion. The more autocratic a government, the more drastic impunity can become.

Autocracies are also associated with characteristics that suggest poor performance outside of the domestic context. Broadly, autocracies perform poorly in terms of human capital and harmonious civil-military relations that predict more effective military forces (Biddle and Long 2004). Autocrats unconstrained domestically by elites or institutions are more likely to engage in or initiate conflict compared to elite-constrained forms of autocracy (Weeks 2012). In battle, militaries from autocracies tend to under-perform relative to their democratic counterparts (Talmadge 2016) because they lack the constraining power of political consent posed by the threat of removal from office through elections (Reiter and Stam 2002). While training and equipment are important characteristics for peacekeepers to achieve their missions (Haass and Ansorg 2018; Kreps 2010), it is not just about the equipment that security personnel have, but how they employ it that makes them effective (Biddle 2004).

In a similar way to the poor performance of security forces from autocracies in battle, military and police from autocracies externalize domestic practices and behaviors when they deploy abroad to UN peace operations– they are the product of their training and experience domestically. Peacekeepers can impact violence against civilians in at least two ways: through their everyday actions which can result in a lack of trust and their work with the

host country government, including training security forces.

Because police and military are on the frontlines of UN peacekeeping, they influence whether crisis situations are resolved or escalated (Dandeker and Gow 1999, 63). Missions must have the ability to effectively engage with host country actors with restraint if they are to be successful. While some peacekeepers choose a more reserved, defensive posture (Ruffa 2018), others engage with the community and create the conditions for local actors to build trust with peacekeepers. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), like ones in Western Equatoria, South Sudan that seek to build rule of law and social cohesion, are intended to develop positive relationships between local actors and peacekeepers (United Nations Peacekeeping N.d.*a*).

Personnel that are instead accustomed to using coercion, exercising force in non-legal ways, all with low accountability (Gonzalez 2021, 15) signal a mismatch between UN priorities and the personnel carrying out the mission. Failures by peacekeepers lead local actors to not engage with UN peacekeepers when they are in need (Gordon and Young 2017). Under-performance by peacekeepers from autocracies can manifest in failure to adhere to the mission's mandate or rules of engagement. Unfortunately, peacekeepers continue to engage in abuse while deployed abroad, including SEA. Peacekeepers who fail to follow through on mission mandates or engage in abusive behavior can escalate already tense situations that can result in more violence. For example, if peacekeepers are unfamiliar with facilitating or protecting nonviolent protests, they won't have the capacity to train host country forces to do so or carry this out themselves (Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney 2021). Regardless of the flag on their uniform, peacekeepers' actions in mission provide local actors with information about peacekeepers' capabilities and resolve.

Given their domestic training and utilization and the way this externalizes to their deployment, I argue that peacekeepers from autocracies can negatively impact civilian protection in UN peace operations relative to peacekeepers from democracies, leading to the following hypothesis:

***H1**: increasing peacekeeping personnel from autocratic regimes relative to personnel from democratic regimes will lead to an increase in the number of civilian fatalities.*

In addition to their everyday interactions with local actors, peacekeepers can also impact violence through their work with host governments, including training security forces. Because of their need for host state consent, peace operations can end up "enabling" autocracy through assistance provided to governments and not punishing autocratic behavior to preserve their relationships, as demonstrated in DRC and the UN's relationship with Joseph Kabila (von Billerbeck and Tansey 2019). One way this can manifest is through work with host country security forces. Training and co-deployment offered through peacekeeping paired with security sector reforms institutionalize training outcomes for government security forces.

Recent work has highlighted how receiving military training acts as a space for norm diffusion (Grewal 2022) and can create norm conflict (Joyce 2022). In UN missions, military and police who provide training to host country security forces act as a space for socialization and learning to occur between peacekeepers and local security forces. Both peacekeepers and local security forces are "embedded in social environments, which not only constrain and provide incentives to act, but also reshape interests and identities" (Checkel 2017, 592). Often peacekeepers are tasked with re-building security forces, providing the opportunity to impart good practices. However, host country security forces can also be socialized into undesirable tactics and behaviors that negatively impact civilians and violence.

In the same way that peacekeepers undergo socialization when deployed on mission (see, for example, Moncrief (2017)), so too do security forces that engage in training and co-deployment with peacekeepers. This is especially the case when peacekeeping missions are tasked with re-training or even reestablishing security institutions. UNPOL may be the most likely venue for these processes, given that UNPOL often train and co-deploy with host country police (Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney 2021; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013). Police officers from autocracies who are not accustomed to protecting civil rights

or who engage in coercive means to achieve their ends are likely to train and socialize local police in these same behaviors and tactics. In this way, peacekeepers from autocracies further hamper mission outcomes, as well as longer-term prospects for peace, if the security forces they train are then engaging in violence and repression to maintain order. Police forces that engage in excessive force demobilize opposition in the immediate term but lead civilians to oppose the police in the long term (Curtice and Behlendorf 2021, 167), leading to further civil-security tensions.

Because of their work with host country governments, including training security forces, peacekeepers from autocracies can impact civilian victimization at the hands of government forces. This leads to the second hypothesis I test in this paper:

H2*: increasing peacekeeping personnel from autocratic regimes relative to personnel from democratic regimes will lead to an increase in OSV committed by government forces.*

Though I argue that increasing the number of peacekeepers from autocracies will have negative implications for civilian protection, it is also the case that security forces in democracies fail to achieve their mandates and engage in violence and abuse both domestically and when deployed abroad. Police in the US and France have been accused and convicted of engaging in racial violence. In South Africa, security forces were accused of misconduct following their repressive response to striking mine workers (De Kadt, Johnson-Kanu and Sands 2023). In some Latin American countries, police remain autocratic enclaves within democracies, engaging in violence and corruption (Gonzalez 2021). Internationally, a Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia in 1993 abused local civilians. After dealing with a rash of theft from the base, senior officials "authorized the men to 'abuse' prisoners caught sneaking into the camp as a deterrent to theft," which culminated in the torture and death of a teenager (Farnsworth 1994). US military forces abused prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. French peacekeepers in CAR faced allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (UN News 2016). While security personnel from democracies have engaged in misconduct and/or failed to achieve their missions, I argue that this kind of behavior is

relatively more likely when personnel from autocracies are deployed to UN peace operations.

In the statistical analyses that follow, I test to see if there is a relationship between the composition of a peace operation in terms of personnel from autocracies and democracies and violence against civilians rather than directly testing either of these two pathways. Following the statistical results, I provide illustrative cases for how these mechanisms could operate in practice.

Data and Methods

To test the relationship between peacekeepers from autocracies and violence against civilians, I utilize panel data on UN peace operation contributions from November 1990 to February 2020. The data for these analyses come from the International Peace Institute's (IPI) Peacekeeping Database, which include the number and type of personnel contributed to each peace operation in a given month (Perry and Smith 2013).

To measure levels of democracy/autocracy, I rely on V-Dem's measure of electoral democracy, polyarchy. This variable is preferred because it captures the extent to which regimes face constraints and accountability, including: electoral competition with extensive suffrage; protections for civil liberties, the media, and civil society; and clean elections (Coppedge et al. 2021). Following previous studies (see, for example, Karim and Beardsley (2016) and Belgioioso, Salvatore and Pinckney (2021)), I create an Autocracy Index variable to measure a contributor's level of democracy/autocracy, weighted by its proportional contribution to the mission in a given month.[2] The equation for this index is:

$$\text{Autocracy Index}_{mt} = \sum_{k=1}^{c} \pi_{kt} \, \text{Polyarchy}_{kt}$$

Where m is the mission at time t, the number of contributing countries is given by c,

[2]Because they do not have polyarchy scores, small island nations' contributions are not included in the data and analyses. These countries are: Grenada, Samoa, Palau, Brunei, Bahamas, and Antigua and Barbuda.

π is the share of peacekeepers from a contributor, and k the contributing country. While higher polyarchy scores signal regimes closer to democracy in the V-Dem data, I reverse this variable such that scores closer to one indicate more autocratic regimes. Higher values for the Autocracy Index thus indicate a mission is more largely composed of peacekeepers from more autocratic countries. I multiply the Autocracy Index by 100 for easier interpretation. In theory, the range of the variable could be from 0 (perfectly democratic) to 100 (perfectly autocratic). In the data, this variable ranges from 9.6 (UNOMIG between September and December 1993) to 84.26 (UNAMI between October and November 2009) with a mean of 36.92. On average, missions in the dataset are more "democratic." The resulting dataset contains a total of 6,096 mission-month observations, including 85 UN peace operations.

To model the effect on violence against civilians for H1, I use UCDP's Geo-referenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 21.1 for civilian fatalities that take place in a given mission-month (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Following Carnegie and Mikulaschek (2020), I focus on UCDP's estimate of civilian fatalities, excluding civilian casualties as a result of collateral damage or cross-fire to focus on the intentional killing of civilians.[3] The dependent variable for H1 includes violence against civilians committed by any side to a violent conflict. For government perpetrated violence (H2), I focus on a subset of these data where the government of the mission host country is reported to have committed OSV against civilians.

Peacekeepers can have both immediate and long-term impacts on violence against civilians in mission host countries. Certainly, it will take time for local actors to discern the resolve of peacekeepers, and training for new or rebuilt security forces also takes time. Yet, given that most modern peace operations are deployed to volatile contexts where there is little to no peace to keep, violent events could provide a rapid test of the resolve and abilities of peacekeepers. As a result, I test different lead times for violence against civilians of one, three, and six months to measure the impact on violence against civilians. Since training security forces can take time, I also test a twelve month lead for government OSV.

[3]Because it is an extreme outlier, the violence in Rwanda in April 1994 is excluded in the analyses.

In addition to the Autocracy Index, I include control variables to address confounding relationships. I include the total number of observers, troops, and police present in a given mission-month as existing work has found that the presence of troops reduces battle fatalities (White, Cunningham and Beardsley 2018), especially while fighting is ongoing (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014). Kathman and Melin (2016) find that observers typically do not reduce civil conflict violence. While Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) find that police and troops are effective at reducing violence against civilians, Carnegie and Mikulaschek (2020) show that the presence of any kind of UN peacekeeper reduces violence against civilians. In the models for this paper, observers and police are scaled to the 100s while troops are scaled to the 1000s.

The quality of security personnel could also confound the relationship between peacekeepers from autocracies and violence against civilians. While military expenditures are available for many countries, few countries provide reliable data on funding for police, making it difficult to directly capture expenditures on these forces. As a result, I rely on GDP per capita data from the World Bank (in 2023 USD) as a proxy for the quality of security forces (The World Bank Group N.d.*a*). I multiply a country's GDP per capita by the total number of peacekeepers contributed to a mission to arrive at a "contingent GDP" for each country's contribution. I then sum these to a single mission-month value for each mission (logged in the analyses). Importantly, while this may be a confounding variable, my argument suggests that this is a post-treatment variable to regime type. As such, I expect that the inclusion of this variable works against my hypotheses causing an under-estimation of the main IV.

The analyses presented in this section follow the model specifications of Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013, 2014) and Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri (2020). I include a count of the number of contributors, which Bove, Ruffa and Ruggeri (2020) find reduces the amount of conflict violence. I also include logged data for population (The World Bank Group N.d.*c*) and population density (The World Bank Group N.d.*b*)– larger and more densely populated areas provide greater potential for civilian targeting. Additionally, I created a dummy vari-

able that takes a value of 1 if there were civilian deaths captured in the month, given that violence in the previous period is likely to impact violence in a following month. Given the longitudinal nature of the data, the over-dispersion of the outcome variables, and the prevalence of zeros, I use negative binomial models with mission-level random intercepts.

Before proceeding to the quantitative results, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this study. Given the observational nature, I cannot firmly conclude where the observed relationships are the result of positive aspects of peacekeepers from democracies or negative aspects of peacekeepers from autocracies. I can observe and predict the differential impact of peacekeepers from democratic and autocratic T/PCCs on violence against civilians in mission host countries, and use evidence from South Sudan and CAR to further demonstrate the feasibility of the theory.

Selection Effects

Though we know that UN peacekeeping missions tend to go to the more challenging contexts (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hegre, Hultman and Nygard 2019), it may be the case that peacekeepers from autocratic countries are sent to more difficult violent conflicts, with democracies choosing to send their peacekeepers to safer missions or vice versa. As a first step, Table 1 analyzes the covariate balance between missions that are above and below the median Autocracy Index (0.36) in the first month of each mission. Though missions composed of more peacekeepers from autocracies tend to have more T/PCCs and more troops, t-tests indicate that there does not appear to be a statistically significant difference between the two groups in terms of violence.

As a second step in addressing whether or not autocracies tend to send their peacekeepers to more dangerous missions, Table 2 looks at the relationship between civilians and battle casualties during the missions and the Autocracy Index led by one, three, and six months. Across the different models, there does not appear to be a statistically significant relationship between civilian casualties during the mission and the mission's Autocracy Index. However, an increase in battle fatalities does predict a slight increase in the Autocracy

Table 1: Balance Test, including 2-sided T-test statistic

	More Democratic		More Autocratic				
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Diff. in Means	Std. Error	t
Civilian Deaths	10.6	36.9	32.0	150.3	21.4	23.9	-0.895
Battle Deaths	34.1	105.8	90.0	323.2	55.9	52.4	-1.067
Government OSV	2.0	8.5	2.3	8.5	0.3	1.9	0.375
No. T/PCCs	13.1	10.8	18.0	14.4	4.9	2.8	-1.765+
Observers	25.4	61.7	51.5	122.3	26.1	21.1	-1.237
Police	76.0	187.1	171.0	376.4	95.0	64.7	-1.468
Troops	673.7	1712.8	2076.0	4497.6	1402.3	741.5	-1.891+
Contingent GDP	11.9M	28.3M	10.5M	26.5M	-1.4M	6M	0.227
Population	14.9M	19.8M	12.4M	12.3M	-2.4M	3.6M	0.678
Population Density	106.4	111.1	89.4	99.8	-17.0	23.6	0.720

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Index in the model with a six-month lead of battle fatalities.

Table 2: In Mission Selection Effects

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	33.553***	33.492***	33.268***	33.609***	33.565***	33.460***
	(0.366)	(0.372)	(0.379)	(0.371)	(0.376)	(0.384)
Civilian Fatalities	0.000 03	0.000 01	0.0009			
	(0.000 03)	(0.000 03)	(0.0004)			
Battle Fatalities				0.0005	0.001	0.001*
				(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Num.Obs.	6012	5844	5606	6012	5844	5606
R2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
AIC	50 872.3	49 484.3	47 505.9	50 871.7	49 482.5	47 501.7
BIC	50 892.4	49 504.3	47 525.8	50 891.8	49 502.5	47 521.6
Log.Lik.	−25 433.171	−24 739.133	−23 749.943	−25 432.850	−24 738.250	−23 747.847
F	1.042	0.095	1.172	1.685	1.862	5.364
RMSE	16.63	16.68	16.74	16.63	16.68	16.73

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Descriptive Trends

Before moving into the main results, I explore descriptive trends in contributions to UN peace operations. Although democratic countries contributed larger shares of personnel during the 1990s (Andersson 2002; Lebovic 2004), contributions to UN peace operations from Western nations have declined since (Bellamy and Williams 2009), with weaker states (Gaibulloev, Sandler and Shimzu 2009), autocracies (Duursma and Gledhill 2019), and countries in Africa and Asia contributing a larger portion of peacekeeping personnel.

To illustrate, Figure 1 plots changes in the composition of UN peace operations from late 1990 to 2020, including a trend line for the total number of peacekeepers deployed. Contributions from democracies composed the majority of missions until the early 2000s, when contributions from autocracies began to rise, crossing the 30,000 mark. Since then, autocracies have fairly consistently provided more peacekeepers than their democratic counterparts, with the more recent decline in peacekeeping personnel the result of a drop in participation of democracies.

There have also been a number of domestic changes in contributing countries. During the 1990-2020 time period, 41 contributors have either trended towards democracy (15), towards autocracy (10), or fluctuated between democratization and autocratization (16).[4] Within just the top 10 T/PCCs, only four countries- Nepal, Indonesia, Ghana, and Senegal- are considered democracies (as of May 2023 and based on V-Dem v11.1). Though more democracies are within the top 25 T/PCCs, autocracies still outnumber democracies, with 15 out of the top 25 contributors considered autocracies.

These changes have meant that some missions are more largely composed of peacekeepers from autocratic T/PCCs. Most peace operations since 2000 have been deployed to African countries, including 5 of the UN's 11 ongoing missions, and Figure 2 demonstrates that UN operations in Africa are more likely to be composed of peacekeeping personnel from

[4]Based on countries' V-Dem polyarchy scores and using the conventional 0.5 cutoff to differentiate.



Figure 1: Total contributions from democratic and autocratic regimes: 1990-2020
Alt text: Figure depicting contributions from democratic and autocratic regimes from 1990-2020.

autocracies. Figure 2 averages the percentage of peacekeepers from autocracies over the course of all missions that have deployed to that country– for example, across all UNAVEM missions in Angola. Missions in Latin America and Europe, which mostly took place during the 1990s (aside from the ongoing missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Cyprus (UNFICYP)), are more likely to be composed of peacekeepers from democracies. Yet some UN operations to Africa have been more largely composed of peacekeepers from autocracies than others: compare missions to CAR (80%) and Sudan (78%) to those to Angola (28%) and Mozambique (19%). Missions to the latter two countries were also not as expansive as the missions in CAR and Sudan– both were observer missions meant to oversee the end of hostilities and withdrawal of foreign forces.



Figure 2: Average Autocratic Pct. in UN Peace Operations
Alt text: Heat map that shows which countries have received more autocratic peacekeeping contingents.

Of the missions in the dataset that had at least 1,000 peacekeepers deployed, UNISFA in Sudan (98.7%), UNFOR in Croatia (92.9%), MINUSCA in CAR (87.3%), UNAVEM I in Angola (76.6%), and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (75.5%) are the top five peace operations based on composition of peacekeeping personnel from autocracies. Conversely, UNFICYP in

Cyprus (99.8%), UNDOF in Syria (96.7%), UNPREDEP in Macedonia (95.7%), ONUSAL in El Salvador (91.1%), and UNMISET in Timor Leste (85.3%) are the top five peace operations in terms of composition of peacekeepers from democracies. As noted, other than Croatia, the remaining missions in the top five for peacekeepers from autocracies are in Africa, compared to the top five for peacekeepers from democracies, which are all outside of Africa.

Findings

I move now to the statistical results. Table 3 presents models with civilian fatalities as the outcome variable with one, three, and six month leads. Note that changes in the Autocracy Index can result from an increase in contributions from autocratic contributors, changes in contributors' polyarchy score, the withdrawal for peacekeepers from democratic contributors, or a combination of the three. Table 3 shows that, across all model specifications, increases in the Autocracy Index for a UN peace operation predicts an increase in the number of civilian fatalities in the following month/s, supporting H1. For each of the different lead times and specifications, the Autocracy Index remains positive and statistically significant.

To demonstrate the effects found in Table 3, Figure 3 is a prediction plot of the predicted number of civilian fatalities across the range of the Autocracy Index for two of the larger UN missions, MINUSCA and UNMISS, which are also the subject of the following section. These *predicted* values are based on the one month lead of civilian fatalities found in the second column of Table 3, with covariates held at their means. At lower levels of the Autocracy Index, we see lower levels of predicted civilian fatalities, but at around an Autocracy Index score of 50, the predicted number of civilian fatalities is 145 in MINUSCA and 65 in UNMISS. Given that the average Autocracy Index score for MINUSCA is 65.2 and 53.8 for UNMISS, the results of these models suggest major consequences for civilians in CAR and South Sudan.

I turn now to H2 and the results for models where the dependent variable is government-perpetrated OSV. Figure 4 shows coefficient plots for models of one, three, six, and twelve

Table 3: Negative Binomial Models- Civilian Fatalities, Autocracy Index

	1 Month	1 Month	3 Months	3 Months	6 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	−0.716*	−21.621***	−0.708*	−24.489***	−0.858*	−27.075***
	(0.326)	(2.677)	(0.328)	(2.801)	(0.347)	(3.048)
Autocracy Index	0.045***	0.028***	0.045***	0.031***	0.045***	0.034***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Total Observers		0.045		0.059		0.098*
		(0.036)		(0.038)		(0.039)
Total Police		0.004		−0.001		−0.002
		(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.010)
Total Troops		−0.022		−0.028+		−0.041*
		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.017)
No. T/PCCs		−0.013*		−0.010		−0.022**
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Contingent GDP (log)		0.021		0.046		0.116*
		(0.045)		(0.048)		(0.052)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)		1.525***		1.215***		1.109***
		(0.075)		(0.073)		(0.074)
Population (log)		1.327***		1.479***		1.582***
		(0.161)		(0.169)		(0.187)
Population Density (log)		−0.050		−0.050		−0.054
		(0.126)		(0.133)		(0.148)
SD (Intercept Mission)	2.276	1.313	2.247	1.394	2.239	1.502
Num.Obs.	6010	5795	5843	5630	5605	5395
R2 Marg.	0.058	0.461	0.060	0.470	0.058	0.471
R2 Cond.	0.587	0.625	0.583	0.645	0.571	0.658
AIC	21 306.7	19 596.9	20 822.2	19 310.4	20 135.3	18 719.5
BIC	21 333.5	19 676.9	20 848.9	19 390.0	20 161.9	18 798.6
ICC	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.4
RMSE	172.57	174.56	175.08	177.65	175.27	178.13

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$



(a) MINUSCA (b) UNMISS

Figure 3: Predicted civilian casualties for MINUSCA and UNMISS, including 95% confidence intervals

Alt text: Prediction plots for civilian fatalities for MINUSCA and UNMISS.

month leads of OSV.[5] All of the models underlying these plots include the same controls as the models in Table 3, but the coefficient plots focus on the Autocracy Index, peacekeeper types, and the number of T/PCCs. Like the previous results, the coefficient for the Autocracy Index is consistently positive and statistically significant: increasing the autocraticness of a peace operation is related to an increase in OSV against civilians by the government.[6]

The plots in Figure 5 again use the examples of MINUSCA and UNMISS to plot predicted government-perpetrated OSV at different levels of the Autocracy Index using the one-month lead of government OSV (Sub-figure (a) in Figure 4). Here, as the Autocracy Index approaches 50, the model predicts about 27 casualties in MINUSCA and 95 in UNMISS. These expectations comport with the contexts of CAR and South Sudan, where violence in CAR has primarily been between rebel groups and, in South Sudan, between the government

[5]Tables of the results appear in the Appendix, Table O.A.1.

[6]Table O.A.2 in the Appendix tests the relationship between the Autocracy Index and non-government OSV. The coefficients for the Autocracy Index remain positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the results found for H1 are not solely driven by government forces.



(a) 1-month lead



(b) 3-month lead



(c) 6-month lead



(d) 12-month lead

Figure 4: Coefficient plots for models of government OSV with 1, 3, 6, and 12 month leads. Alt text: Coefficient plots for OSV committed by government forces.

and rebels. In South Sudan, government forces have been responsible for atrocities against civilians while also blocking UNMISS's access to certain areas of the country.

In the Online Appendix, I include a range of robustness checks to verify the results of these models. To address concerns of endogeneity, I take two approaches. First, I use seemingly unrelated regression, allowing the errors from the first-stage model for peace operation deployment (Table O.A.5) to correlate with errors from the second-stage model for violence against civilians (Table O.A.6). While the results for civilian victimization as a whole remain positive and significant, the coefficients for government OSV are positive but fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance, casting doubt on the findings presented in this section for H2. Second, following Linn and Webb (2023), I test the weak exogeneity assumption that the autocraticness of a mission impacts civilian victimization and not the other way around (Table O.A.9). The findings and theory provided are consistent with weak exogeneity assumption required for hypothesis testing.

In addition to these tests, I also include a number of other operationalizations and modeling specifications. Rather than using an indexing approach to measure democratic and autocratic participation, I include models that utilize the conventionally used cut-off of 0.5 for a country's polyarchy score to differentiate between democracies and autocracies (Tables O.A.12 and O.A.13). I also include models that use Polity V scores (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2015) instead of polyarchy (Tables O.A.7 and O.A.8). I'd also expect that my theory applies to liberal democracies as illiberal democracies are likely to have fewer avenues for accountability; therefore, I also test the component parts of polyarchy (Tables O.A.15 and O.A.16). Additionally, I include models that incorporate the polyarchy score of the mission host country, as a measure of potential affinity between contributors and the host country (Tables O.A.10 and O.A.11). Finally, I include OLS models (Tables O.A.3 and O.A.4). While these robustness checks provide consistent support for H1, there is inconsistent support for H2. Thus, while we can be confident in rejecting the null hypothesis for H1, there is less support for rejecting the null hypothesis for H2.



(a) MINUSCA (b) UNMISS

Figure 5: Predicted government OSV for MINUSCA and UNMISS, including 95% confidence intervals
Alt text: Prediction plots for government OSV for MINUSCA and UNMISS.

Building Trust and Training Local Security Forces

Given these results, I explore two plausible explanations for how peacekeepers from autocracies negatively impact violence against civilians: trust-building between peacekeepers and local actors and security force training. To do so, I rely on examples from the UN missions in CAR (MINUSCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS). There are likely other ways peacekeepers from autocracies can negatively impact violence in addition to trust and training, though space constraints limit a more thorough survey of the possibilities.

Peacekeepers can hinder trust building with civilians through their actions and behavior when deployed by failing to follow through on mission mandates or engaging in misconduct/abuse. Importantly, existing work has demonstrated that civilians who witness or experience abuse at the hands of peacekeepers hold more negative views of peacekeepers and are less likely to cooperate with them (Gordon and Young 2017), further damaging the mission's ability to effectively protect civilians. If peacekeepers fail to protect civilians, belligerents, whether rebel groups or the government, view the targeting of civilians as a viable

tactic to achieve their aims. In this way, violence can beget further violence when civilians no longer trust the abilities of peacekeepers.

In DRC, protests, sometimes violent, broke out against MONUSCO in Butembo as a result of multiple instances where peacekeepers were unable to protect civilians from rebel violence– peacekeepers eventually retreated in August 2022 (Reuters 2022). Similar occurrences have taken place in Mali in 2015, where protesters were killed by peacekeepers after a violent protest at the mission's compound in Gao (UN News 2015), and in Haiti, where the mission drew down in 2019 amid multiple weeks of violent anti-government protests (Martinez Casares 2019). In addition to instances where peacekeepers have killed civilians, tense conditions create the opportunity for further civilian abuse. In Mali, discontent with MINUSMA led to the mission winding down amid reports of increased violence against civilians, especially women, committed both by Malian forces and "foreign security partners" the country has turned to stabilize the security situation (Nichols 2023).

We also see evidence of this from UNMISS. A rash of violence broke out in Juba in July 2016 between government forces and the SPLA-IO. At the time, SPLA-IO forces were located near the UN House which included a protection of civilians (PoC) site, meaning that, as violence broke out, the UN House was quickly subject to crossfire. At the time, China, Ethiopia, India, and Nepal had troops at UN House. As the violence continued, some peacekeepers were wounded and others at the UN House abandoned their posts, retreating further into the compound. Notably, a report on the response to the violence in Juba in 2016 argued that the failure of the mission to provide protection to civilians "resulted in a loss of *trust* and confidence...in the will and skill of UNMISS military and police to be proactive and show a determined posture to protect civilians under threat" (United Nations Security Council 2016, 6, emphasis added). This sentiment was reinforced by remarks from a civilian in a protection of civilian site in South Sudan, who stated that peacekeepers are "here for protection but when the real fighting comes, they run...I used to talk to the peacekeepers, but I don't anymore. I am angry with what I have seen" (Center for Civilians in Conflict

2016, 78). The in-/actions by UNMISS peacekeepers in Juba lead to a deterioration in the relationship between peacekeepers and civilians, which ultimately put civilians in harm's way.

In CAR, MINUSCA deployed in 2014 in an effort to address inter-communal violence. At an internally displaced persons (IDP) site in Alindao, Mauritanian peacekeepers were tasked with providing security for civilians. In November 2018, a rebel group attacked the site, resulting in the deaths of at least 112 civilians (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019). Reports from UN investigations following the attack demonstrated that peacekeepers failed to deter crime committed by rebel group elements within the site, some of whom maintained their weapons (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019, 10). Witnesses also noted that peacekeepers often fraternized with rebel fighters (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019, 9). The failure of Mauritanian peacekeepers to gain a handle on crime within the site and their perceived connections with rebel fighters allowed inter-communal violence within and outside the site to continue, ultimately resulting in the attack against the IDP site (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 2019). Interviews with UN personnel following the violence reveal that the Mauritanian personnel responsible for the area were ill-prepared for their deployment, lacking an understanding of the UN's PoC mandate as well as the rules of engagement (Di Razza and Sherman 2020). Though acting as a physical barrier and disarming combatants are key ways peacekeepers prevent violence against civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013), allowing arms in IDP sites, seeming to support rebel fighters, and then failing to engage the attackers eliminated the effectiveness of these mechanisms and trust between IDPs and peacekeepers.

In addition to their everyday (in-)actions, UN personnel can also impact peace through the training they provide to host country security forces with both immediate and long-term consequences. Because they work to train and build host country security forces, the impact

is more likely to be seen in the performance of the host country's police and military in how they carry out their duties afterwards.

Trainings are often part of a larger program of reforms focusing on restructuring the coercive capacity of security forces to be able to maintain peace (Toft 2009), but can also include efforts to increase restraint and inclusion (Karim 2019). Increasing the coercive capacity of police can lead to police violence, but reforms that decrease militarization and increase accountability have been found to reduce levels of police violence (Tiscornia 2023). Attitudes towards police and security forces more broadly are influenced by citizens' interaction with these personnel and the latter's actions (Curtice and Behlendorf 2021; Karim 2020), ultimately informing citizens' willingness to engage with and trust the police (Blair, Karim and Morse 2019; Karim 2019).

In South Sudan, successive missions (UNMIS and UNMISS) were involved in training the South Sudanese National Police (Hunt 2022). The same police service was then implicated in violence that broke out in 2013 (Hunt 2022) and in 2016 (United Nations Mission in South Sudan and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017). The UN's efforts in South Sudan "had essentially been working closely with government and UNPOL had bolstered the security agencies that turned on their own people to devastating effect" (Hunt 2022, 18). As a result, UN peacekeepers could be enabling autocratic tendencies, especially when they refrain from punishing this kind of behavior for the sake of maintaining host state consent (von Billerbeck and Tansey 2019).

Conclusion

The results from this study are worrying for the UN as the preeminent organization tasked with maintaining international peace and security. I've found that increasing contributions from autocratic T/PCCs to UN peace operations are related to an increase in violence against civilians, with mixed evidence that this impacts government-perpetrated OSV. Since peacekeeping contributions from autocracies have grown relative to contributions from democra-

cies, this could be indicative of a dangerous trend for UN peace operations. While initial missions during the Cold War mainly focused on inserting security personnel to maintain ceasefires, Blue Helmets have been called on to undertake additional and more complex tasks to keep and build peace both in countries experiencing and emerging from violent conflict. Existing evidence points to the remarkable ability of peace operations to bring peace to the violent conflict-affected areas, but this paper along with recent work by von Billerbeck and Tansey (2019) and Day et al. (2021) demonstrate areas for needed improvement.

In this paper, I've suggested that existing observations about the effectiveness of peacekeeping are attenuated when we look further into the places from which peacekeepers are deployed. Observations about quality and domestic characteristics are driven by a contributor's regime type. Regimes that are less constrained and accountable to domestic actors, in general, have greater autonomy to engage in a variety of practices to restrict liberties and freedoms afforded to constituents of more accountable and constrained regimes. Security forces from these contexts externalize their domestic training and utilization when they deploy abroad as peacekeepers. In the quantitative section, I found robust statistical evidence that higher levels of autocratic participation in UN peace operations is related to an increase in violence against civilians in mission host countries. There is less robust evidence, however, that this has an effect on government OSV. There are likely a number of ways in which peacekeepers can negatively impact violence against civilians. In this paper, I have proposed that peacekeepers from autocracies will be unable to build trust with local actors and that their training of local security forces will have negative impacts on peace efforts.

My findings have implications for the UN and its peace operations more broadly. As an organization that relies on its member states to provide the resources for peacekeeping, the UN is both constrained by its position and uniquely positioned to affect change. Though ensuring peacekeepers undergo proper training may be an important first step given the number of situations where security forces do not undergo required training, this is likely not enough to counteract the practices and strategies security forces in autocracies utilize

in their everyday work. Strong mechanisms of accountability are necessary to ensure that misconduct is handled properly.

Recent work has demonstrated the impact of naming and shaming in the area of SEA, where countries accused of SEA in UN peace operations are more likely to adopt legal frameworks addressing SEA by their forces and are also more likely to reduce their personnel contributions (Torres-Beltran and Mailhot 2024). The UN currently has separate reporting requirements for SEA allegations and what the UN refers to as "other misconduct." While UN SEA reporting includes the nationality of the peacekeeper, actions in the other misconduct category (including theft, prohibited conduct, and obstruction of accountability) only include information on the mission, the type of misconduct, and a count of actions in each thematic area and type of misconduct. While SEA is a particularly serious offense, elevating reporting requirements for other misconduct to the same level could have a stronger effect on influencing T/PCC behavior.

In addition to improving reporting on peacekeeping misconduct, the UN should reconsider how it handles peacekeeper misconduct. Currently, the most the UN can do is request to remove personnel from a mission, with T/PCCs meant to handle adjudication for misconduct in mission. But there are currently no mechanisms of accountability for the UN to ensure that misconduct allegations are properly handled by T/PCCs. The naming and shaming that is associated with SEA allegations can have material and reputational consequences for the countries whose peacekeepers are identified as allegedly engaging in SEA which can induce a T/PCC to take action (Torres-Beltran and Mailhot 2024). Given the motivations for T/PCCs to participate mentioned earlier (coup proofing and training), potentially jeopardizing these benefits could incentivize T/PCCs to improve and potentially reform. Strengthening reporting requirements for all kinds of misconduct in UN peace operations, not only SEA, could lead T/PCCs to ensure that peacekeepers accused of misconduct face proper domestic legal avenues for addressing their behavior.

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Online Supplementary Information for "Autocrats Keeping Peace? Autocratic Contributions to UN Peace Operations and Civilian Protection"

Contents

0.1 Table for Government OSV

Table O.A.1: Government OSV

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	12 Months
(Intercept)	−27.525***	−30.596***	−33.544***	−40.537***
	(4.602)	(4.780)	(5.396)	(6.530)
Autocracy Index	0.029***	0.032***	0.028***	0.019**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Total Observers	−0.024	−0.003	−0.017	−0.031
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Total Police	0.012	0.002	−0.003	−0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Total Troops	0.034	0.045+	0.070**	0.072**
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Contingent GDP (log)	0.028	0.029	0.057	−0.061
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.097)
No. T/PCCs	−0.014	−0.015	−0.031**	−0.014
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.271***	0.797***	0.771***	0.603***
	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.112)
Population (log)	1.576***	1.771***	1.954***	2.477***
	(0.268)	(0.281)	(0.325)	(0.410)
Population Density (log)	0.136	0.128	0.089	−0.057
	(0.192)	(0.201)	(0.225)	(0.280)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.833	1.936	2.094	2.550
Num.Obs.	5795	5630	5395	4976
R2 Marg.	0.400	0.415	0.436	0.492
R2 Cond.	0.635	0.659	0.687	0.766
AIC	8799.0	8662.9	8319.4	7524.7
BIC	8879.0	8742.6	8398.5	7602.9
ICC	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
RMSE	161.76	164.34	168.08	62.60

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.2 Non-Government OSV

Table O.A.2: Non-Government OSV

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	12 Months
(Intercept)	−24.218***	−27.847***	−29.966***	−32.121***
	(3.589)	(3.804)	(4.001)	(4.144)
Autocracy Index	0.026***	0.029***	0.032***	0.036***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Total Observers	0.054	0.081+	0.126**	0.081+
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.046)
Total Police	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.021
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Total Troops	−0.038+	−0.059**	−0.080***	−0.071**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Contingent GDP (log)	−0.060	−0.010	0.046	0.058
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.066)
No. T/PCCs	0.001	0.004	−0.007	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.707***	1.516***	1.365***	1.180***
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Population (log)	1.454***	1.626***	1.718***	1.822***
	(0.231)	(0.246)	(0.260)	(0.272)
Population Density (log)	−0.109	−0.117	−0.106	−0.109
	(0.198)	(0.212)	(0.224)	(0.242)
SD (Intercept Mission)	2.084	2.215	2.261	2.371
Num.Obs.	5795	5630	5395	4976
R2 Marg.	0.581	0.579	0.580	0.577
R2 Cond.	0.998	0.998	0.998	0.998
AIC	14984.2	14735.2	14343.7	13472.0
BIC	15064.2	14814.8	14422.8	13550.1
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	59.75	60.67	49.96	51.39

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.3 OLS Models

Table O.A.3: Civilian Fatalities- Logged DVs, clustered SE by Mission, Random Effects

	1 Month	1 Month	3 Months	3 Months	6 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	−0.919	−7.270***	−0.982	−8.849***	−0.989	−10.292***
	(0.865)	(1.823)	(0.877)	(2.125)	(0.908)	(2.543)
Autocracy Index	0.043+	0.026*	0.044*	0.030*	0.043+	0.031*
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.016)
Total Observers		0.012		0.023		0.031
		(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.057)
Total Police		0.005		0.001		0.001
		(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.008)
Total Troops		−0.011		−0.017		−0.021
		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.017)
No. T/PCCs		−0.011+		−0.010		−0.015+
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.008)
Contingent GDP (log)		0.038		0.068		0.097
		(0.046)		(0.052)		(0.064)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)		1.354***		1.136***		1.025***
		(0.211)		(0.217)		(0.214)
Population (log)		0.354***		0.419***		0.482***
		(0.096)		(0.104)		(0.115)
Population Density (log)		0.156+		0.158		0.186
		(0.091)		(0.101)		(0.123)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.039	0.645	1.001	0.652	0.934	0.670
Num.Obs.	6010	5795	5843	5630	5605	5395
R2 Marg.	0.186	0.438	0.202	0.423	0.206	0.422
R2 Cond.	0.581	0.611	0.573	0.596	0.546	0.598
AIC	18 201.0	16 378.3	17 696.3	16 242.8	17 039.5	15 739.4
BIC	18 227.8	16 458.3	17 723.0	16 322.4	17 066.1	15 818.6
ICC	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3
RMSE	1.06	0.96	1.07	0.99	1.07	1.01

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table O.A.4: Government OSV Against Civilians- Logged DVs, clustered SE by Mision, Random Effects

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	12 Months
(Intercept)	−27.525***	−30.596***	−33.544***	−40.537***
	(4.602)	(4.780)	(5.396)	(6.530)
Autocracy Index	0.010	0.011	0.009	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Total Observers	−0.029	−0.006	−0.021	−0.024
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.047)
Total Police	0.008	0.005	0.007	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Total Troops	0.014	0.013	0.021*	0.024
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Contingent GDP (log)	0.040	0.051	0.045	0.039
	(0.064)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.063)
No. T/PCCs	−0.009	−0.010	−0.011	−0.008
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	0.521*	0.350*	0.306*	0.262*
	(0.214)	(0.165)	(0.152)	(0.126)
Population (log)	0.159	0.206*	0.208**	0.232*
	(0.115)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.092)
Population Density (log)	0.108	0.113	0.103	0.068
	(0.123)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.114)
SD (Intercept Mission)	0.521	0.466	0.400	0.354
Num.Obs.	5795	5630	5395	4976
R2 Marg.	0.186	0.185	0.188	0.198
R2 Cond.	0.464	0.416	0.370	0.346
AIC	13025.1	12896.5	12416.4	11418.8
BIC	13105.1	12976.1	12495.5	11496.9
ICC	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
RMSE	0.72	0.74	0.74	0.74

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

0.4 Seemingly Unrelated Regression

Table O.A.5: Stage 1: PK Deployment

	Civilians			OSV		
	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
PKO	0.042	0.027	−0.018	0.039	0.025	-0.019
	(0.509)	(0.509)	(0.511)	(0.507)	(0.508)	(0.51)
Civ. Fatalities	0.0002	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.002)
Population (log)	−0.111	−0.118	−0.133	-0.11	-0.117	-0.133
	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)
GDP (log)	0.068	0.069	0.067	0.07	0.07	0.069
	(0.296)	(0.297)	(0.301)	(0.296)	(0.297)	(0.301)
Polyarchy	−1.950	−2.021	−2.145	-1.963	.2029	-2.152
	(1.865)	(1.837)	(1.905)	(1.862)	(1.872)	(1.904)
Num.Obs.	6629	6591	6513	6790	6754	6678

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table O.A.6: Stage 2: Civilian Fatalities and OSV

	Civilians			OSV		
	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
Autocracy Index	1.296*	1.294*	1.091**	0.329	0.347	0.202
	(0.595)	(0.554)	(0.373)	(0.473)	(0.429)	(0.25)
Total Observers	15.14	14.57	11.00*	7.362	7.969	4.364
	(8.343)	(8.775)	(5.358)	(6.216)	(6.839)	(3.401)
Total Police	0.278	0.101	0.295	0.426	0.27	0.356
	(0.702)	(0.565)	(0.609)	(0.606)	(0.334)	(0.312)
Total Troops	−2.294	−2.342	−1.187	-1.277	-1.462	-0.239
	(1.489)	(1.685)	(0.844)	(10.35)	(1.199)	(0.361)
Contingent GDP (log)	5.457*	6.708*	3.096	4.085	5.299	0.943
	(2.308)	(3.310)	(3.007)	(2.29)	(3.444)	(1.704)
No. T/PCCs	−1.218*	−1.185*	−1.107*	-0.7	-0.672	-0.536
	(0.551)	(−2.09)	(0.463)	(0.526)	(0.522)	(0.412)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	46.58**	36.31***	26.12***	19.33	11.52	4.08
	(15.369)	(10.677)	(7.359)	(10.952)	(6.261)	(4.792)
Population (log)	−2.597	−0.383	1.138	-2.884	-1.305	-1.039
	(5.419)	(4.137)	(4.066)	(3.853)	(2.695)	(2.647)
Population Density (log)	10.56	8.838	7.988	-	-	-
	(9.529)	(8.380)	(7.813)	-	-	-
Num.Obs.	6629	6591	6513	6790	6754	6678

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.5 Polity Models

Table O.A.7: Negative Binomial Models- Civilian Fatalities, Polity V (1990-2018)

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	−21.428***	−24.444***	−26.706***
	(2.808)	(2.938)	(3.140)
Polity Index	0.009***	0.011***	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Observers	0.007	0.014	0.050
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Total Police	−0.003	−0.011	−0.014
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Total Troops	−0.005	−0.009	−0.020
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Contingent GDP (log)	−0.095*	−0.083+	−0.018
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.053)
No. T/PCCs	0.004	0.011	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.617***	1.296***	1.187***
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Population (log)	1.436***	1.611***	1.712***
	(0.172)	(0.181)	(0.196)
Population Density (log)	0.011	0.003	−0.044
	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.152)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.354	1.457	1.531
Num.Obs.	5583	5452	5267
R2 Marg.	0.739	0.731	0.728
R2 Cond.	0.996	0.997	0.997
AIC	18 654.5	18 529.5	18 190.8
BIC	18 734.0	18 608.7	18 269.7
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	177.38	180.49	180.32

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table O.A.8: Negative Binomial Models- Government OSV, Polity V (1990-2018)

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	−11.275***	−12.301***	−13.023***
	(2.841)	(3.018)	(3.253)
Polity Index	0.006*	0.006+	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Total Observers	−0.085	−0.067	−0.062
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Total Police	0.009	−0.003	−0.007
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Total Troops	0.055*	0.068**	0.090***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Contingent GDP (log)	−0.028	−0.041	−0.013
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.085)
No. T/PCCs	0.001	0.002	−0.021+
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.429***	0.929***	0.895***
	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Population (log)	1.526***	1.757***	2.076***
	(0.267)	(0.284)	(0.341)
Population Density (log)	0.118	0.102	0.062
	(0.191)	(0.203)	(0.233)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.787	1.934	2.179
Num.Obs.	5583	5452	5267
R2 Marg.	0.621	0.616	0.634
R2 Cond.	0.995	0.995	0.996
AIC	8305.0	8243.9	8050.4
BIC	8384.5	8323.1	8129.2
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	164.64	166.98	170.04

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

0.6 Testing for Weak Exogeneity

Table O.A.9: Stage 2: Weak Exogeneity Tests

	Civilians			OSV		
	Civ. Fatal	Aut. Index	Test	Govt. OSV	Aut. Index	Test
(Intercept)	−89.249+	92.320***	0.000	−35.435	92.320***	
	(48.974)	(3.198)	(7.856)	(45.444)	(3.198)	
Autocracy Index	1.082***		0.000	0.559**		0.000
	(0.186)		(0.206)	(0.172)		(0.193)
Total Observers	14.871***	−2.550***		8.884***	−2.550***	
	(2.394)	(0.165)		(2.221)	(0.165)	
Total Police	0.070	0.057+		0.157	0.057+	
	(0.433)	(0.031)		(0.401)	(0.031)	
Total Troops	−2.165**	0.961***		−1.460*	0.961***	
	(0.735)	(0.050)		(0.682)	(0.050)	
Contingent GDP (log)	4.962**	−2.788***		3.217*	−2.788***	
	(1.745)	(0.116)		(1.619)	(0.116)	
No. T/PCCs	−1.019***	0.449***		−0.551*	0.449***	
	(0.246)	(0.016)		(0.229)	(0.016)	
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	45.333***	6.404***		20.456***	6.404***	
	(5.818)	(0.401)		(5.399)	(0.401)	
Population (log)	−3.019	−0.503**		−3.858+	−0.503**	
	(2.181)	(0.153)		(2.024)	(0.153)	
Population Density (log)	10.219***	−4.376***		8.771***	−4.376***	
	(2.528)	(0.168)		(2.345)	(0.168)	
$\hat{e}_{AI}$			0.000			0.000
			(0.278)			(0.258)
Num.Obs.	5795	5879	5795	5795	5879	5795
R2	0.029	0.447	0.000	0.009	0.447	0.000
R2 Adj.	0.027	0.446	0.000	0.007	0.446	0.000
AIC	76 288.5	46 272.4	76 274.5	75 421.4	46 272.4	75 407.4
BIC	76 361.8	46 339.2	76 301.1	75 494.7	46 339.2	75 434.0
Log.Lik.	−38 133	−23 126	−38 133	−37 699	−23 126	−37 699
F		592.262	0.000		592.262	0.000
RMSE	174.41	12.36	174.41	161.84	12.36	161.84

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.7 Including Mission Host Country Polyarchy Score

Table O.A.10: Civilian Fatalities- Including Host Country Polyarchy

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	−20.197***	−22.743***	−24.849***
	(2.651)	(2.754)	(2.990)
Autocracy Index	0.028***	0.031***	0.034***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Host Polyarchy	−0.671	−0.549	−0.143
	(0.545)	(0.559)	(0.586)
Total Observers	0.047	0.060	0.098*
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Total Police	0.004	−0.001	−0.002
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Total Troops	−0.018	−0.025	−0.040*
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Contingent GDP (log)	0.024	0.051	0.118*
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.052)
No. T/PCCs	−0.013*	−0.010	−0.022**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.533***	1.224***	1.114***
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Population (log)	1.291***	1.452***	1.579***
	(0.160)	(0.169)	(0.188)
Population Density (log)	−0.014	−0.023	−0.054
	(0.126)	(0.134)	(0.151)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.256	1.351	1.489
Num.Obs.	5783	5618	5383
R2 Marg.	0.755	0.743	0.719
R2 Cond.	0.996	0.996	0.997
AIC	19585.6	19299.3	18708.7
BIC	19672.3	19385.6	18794.4
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	174.76	177.84	178.32

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table O.A.11: Government OSV Against Civilians- Including Host Country Polyarchy

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	12 Months
(Intercept)	−25.834***	−28.924***	−32.251***	−38.716***
	(4.537)	(4.723)	(5.333)	(6.554)
Autocracy Index	0.028***	0.031***	0.027***	0.018**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Host Polyarchy	−1.792+	−1.861+	−1.858+	−2.006+
	(0.917)	(0.951)	(1.004)	(1.194)
Total Observers	−0.020	0.002	−0.009	−0.021
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Total Police	0.011	0.000	−0.005	−0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Total Troops	0.044+	0.055*	0.079**	0.084**
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Contingent GDP (log)	0.028	0.032	0.061	−0.076
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.099)
No. T/PCCs	−0.014	−0.015	−0.031**	−0.012
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.281***	0.811***	0.784***	0.604***
	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.111)
Population (log)	1.490***	1.685***	1.892***	2.392***
	(0.262)	(0.275)	(0.319)	(0.408)
Population Density (log)	0.228	0.219	0.173	0.055
	(0.189)	(0.198)	(0.224)	(0.280)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.715	1.818	2.004	2.457
Num.Obs.	5783	5618	5383	4964
R2 Marg.	0.671	0.671	0.670	0.670
R2 Cond.	0.995	0.996	0.996	0.997
AIC	8785.9	8649.6	8305.7	7504.7
BIC	8872.6	8735.8	8391.4	7589.3
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	161.97	164.51	168.32	62.68

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.8 Polyarchy- Binary Indicator

Table O.A.12: Civilian Fatalities- Binary Polyarchy Variable

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months
(Intercept)	−20.197***	−22.743***	−24.849***
	(2.651)	(2.754)	(2.990)
Pct. PK from Aut.	0.013***	0.014***	0.015***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Observers	0.036	0.044	0.076+
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Total Police	0.008	0.002	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Total Troops	−0.016	−0.020	−0.031+
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Contingent GDP (log)	−0.049	−0.033	0.024
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.050)
No. T/PCCs	−0.008	−0.004	−0.015*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.588***	1.285***	1.192***
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Population (log)	1.334***	1.479***	1.573***
	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.185)
Population Density (log)	−0.049	−0.058	−0.083
	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.147)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.303	1.374	1.481
Num.Obs.	5795	5630	5395
R2 Marg.	0.741	0.735	0.721
R2 Cond.	0.996	0.996	0.997
AIC	19641.6	19357.5	18773.6
BIC	19721.5	19437.1	18852.8
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	174.23	177.77	178.21

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table O.A.13: Government OSV Against Civilians- Binary Polyarchy Variable

	1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	12 Months
(Intercept)	−26.383***	−29.281***	−33.401***	−40.973***
	(4.606)	(4.801)	(5.577)	(6.750)
Pct. PK from Aut.	0.010**	0.010**	0.006	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Total Observers	−0.035	−0.021	−0.037	−0.046
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Total Police	0.016	0.004	−0.003	−0.014
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Total Troops	0.040+	0.057*	0.084***	0.085**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Contingent GDP (log)	−0.027	−0.044	−0.023	−0.146
	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.090)
No. T/PCCs	−0.011	−0.010	−0.026*	−0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.354***	0.896***	0.873***	0.700***
	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.111)
Population (log)	1.597***	1.804***	2.064***	2.613***
	(0.271)	(0.284)	(0.338)	(0.426)
Population Density (log)	0.127	0.115	0.072	−0.081
	(0.192)	(0.202)	(0.234)	(0.296)
SD (Intercept Mission)	1.833	1.946	2.213	2.732
Num.Obs.	5795	5630	5395	4976
R2 Marg.	0.631	0.630	0.628	0.634
R2 Cond.	0.995	0.996	0.996	0.997
AIC	8813.4	8683.3	8337.4	7533.3
BIC	8893.4	8763.0	8416.5	7611.5
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	161.57	164.41	168.03	62.57

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.9 Pre-Mission Selection Effects- Violence 5 years before deployment

Table O.A.14: Pre-Mission Selection Effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	37.382***	37.419***	38.242***	29.859***	35.729***	36.220***	36.225***
	(1.777)	(1.780)	(1.619)	(2.447)	(1.686)	(1.664)	(1.829)
Total Fatalities	0.0002						
	(0.0001)						
Battle Fatalities		0.001					
		(0.0004)					
Civilian Fatalities			0.0003				
			(0.0002)				
Mean T/PCCs				0.373***			
				(0.086)			
Mean Troops					0.001**		
					(0.0003)		
Mean Police						0.007**	
						(0.002)	
Mean Observers							0.026*
							(0.012)
Num.Obs.	85	85	85	86	86	86	86
R2	0.027	0.026	0.012	0.181	0.112	0.092	0.055
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.014	0.000	0.172	0.101	0.082	0.043
AIC	692.6	692.8	693.9	687.2	694.2	696.0	699.5
BIC	700.0	700.1	701.2	694.5	701.5	703.4	706.9
Log.Lik.	−343.315	−343.383	−343.955	−340.577	−344.087	−345.020	−346.774
F	2.312	2.174	1.036	18.616	10.572	8.544	4.843
RMSE	13.74	13.75	13.84	12.70	13.22	13.37	13.64

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.10 Components of Polyarchy

Table O.A.15: Civilian Fatalities

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	−15.499***	−17.009***	−14.318***	−16.533***
	(3.159)	(3.255)	(3.091)	(3.222)
Liberal Dem. Index	0.027***			
	(0.004)			
Particip. Dem. Index		0.038***		
		(0.005)		
Delib. Dem. Index			0.023***	
			(0.004)	
Egal. Dem. Index				0.032***
				(0.004)
Contingent GDP (log)	−0.018	−0.028	−0.030	−0.025
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Total Observers	−0.005	0.007	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Total Police	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Total Troops	−0.027+	−0.025	−0.028+	−0.030+
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
No. T/PCCs	−0.007	−0.007	−0.004	−0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.444***	1.426***	1.459***	1.425***
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Population (log)	1.013***	1.054***	0.968***	1.053***
	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.178)	(0.185)
Population Density (log)	−0.232	−0.208	−0.259+	−0.197
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.145)
SD (Intercept)	1.335	1.338	1.326	1.354
SD (Observations)	142.938	142.790	143.625	142.314
Num.Obs.	5796	5796	5796	5796
R2 Marg.	0.409	0.421	0.396	0.415
R2 Cond.	0.594	0.602	0.583	0.602
AIC	19543.6	19536.5	19555.7	19532.0
BIC	19643.6	19636.5	19655.6	19631.9
ICC	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
RMSE	174.27	174.24	174.21	174.13

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table O.A.16: Government OSV

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	−27.994***	−28.057***	−26.807***	−27.953***
	(4.537)	(4.516)	(4.486)	(4.474)
Liberal Dem. Index	0.032***			
	(0.006)			
Particip. Dem. Index		0.038***		
		(0.008)		
Delib. Dem. Index			0.025***	
			(0.006)	
Egal. Dem. Index				0.039***
				(0.006)
Contingent GDP (log)	0.077	0.050	0.052	0.078
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Total Observers	−0.034	−0.026	−0.034	−0.032
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Total Police	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.014
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Total Troops	0.028	0.030	0.030	0.023
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
No. T/PCCs	−0.017+	−0.015	−0.013	−0.019*
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Civilian Fatalities (binary)	1.247***	1.240***	1.291***	1.210***
	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Population (log)	1.540***	1.528***	1.512***	1.511***
	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.261)	(0.261)
Population Density (log)	0.120	0.110	0.106	0.121
	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.191)
SD (Intercept)	1.814	1.806	1.792	1.824
Num.Obs.	5795	5795	5795	5795
R2 Marg.	0.621	0.623	0.616	0.615
R2 Cond.	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995
AIC	8792.9	8795.2	8803.0	8781.7
BIC	8872.8	8875.2	8883.0	8861.7
ICC	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
RMSE	161.77	161.74	161.72	161.68

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001